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[L. A. No. 25119. In Bank. Apr. 22, 1959.]

THE PEOPLE et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF LONG
BEACH, Respondent.
[1] M1lDicipal Oorporations-Propeny-Tidelanda-Grant to Oity
by State.-The specific purpose set forth in the 1935 statute
amending the trust terms of a grant to the city of Long Beach
of the state's interest in tide and submerged lands within the
city's corporate limits to promote "the moral and social welfare of Beamen, naval officers and enlisted men, and other
persons engaged in and about the harbor and eommerce,
fishery and navigation" (Stats. 1935, ch. 158, p. 794), is not
only eonsistent with but in direct aid of the basic trust purpose set out in the original grant to establish and maintain
a harbor and necessary or eonvenient related facilities for
the "promotion and accoD11llodation of commerce and navigation" (Stats. 1911, ch. 676, p. 1305). Personnel are as vital

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 456 et seq.
licK. Dig. References: [1,2] Municipal Corporations, § 383; [3)
Stnte of California, § 33; [4, 5] Municipal Corporations, § 385.
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to these activities as the ships and othcr facilities used therein, and no distinction can properly be drawn betwcen providin~ dormitories and other facilities for maritime personn('l
and docks for ships, warehouses for goods, or convention, exhibition, Rnd banquet halls for use by trade, shipping and
cOlllmercial organizations.
[2] Id.~Property-'1'idelands-Grant to Oity by State.-Promotioll "of the moral and socinl welfare of seamen, naval otTIccrs
and enlisted men, and other persons engaged in and about the
harbor and commerce, fishery, and navigation" (Stats. 1935,
ch. 158, p. 794), such as by construction of a building on a
tideland site to be leased to the Y.M.C.A., is of sufficient local
concern to justify the expenditure of purely municipal funds
therefor, but as purposes of a trust for commerce, navigation
and fishery they are also for the benefit for all the people
of the state, and accordingly trust income may properly be
devoted thereto.
[3] State of California - Fiscal Ma.tters - Limitations - Gift of
Public Funds.-Assuming that a grant in aid to a private
organization is a "gift" to and "for the purpose and benefit
of" such organization within the meaning of Const., art. IV,
§§ 22 and 31, prohibiting such assistance to private institutions,
even though the organization is thereby enabled to promote
some public purpose, the performance of a bona fide contract
by a public body is not the making of a gift, nor is it "for the
purpose and benefit of" the private contractor within the meaning of such constitutional provision, since if it were, the state
would be powerless to contract with any organization not expressly exempted from the constitutional limitations.
[4] Municipal Oorporations-Property-'1'idelands-Leases.-Proposed construction of a building hy the city of Long Beach on
tidelands granted the city by the state for trust purposes and
lease of the building to the Y.M.C.A. for 25 years for continued operation of the Armed Services Y.M.C.A. does not amount
to a grant in fee or appropriation of money to a private organization ",here the Y.M.e.A. receives only the use of the building
for 25 years on condition that it at all times carl'Y out the truflt
purposes for the public benefit under the city's supervision,
its rights in the building terminating when it ceases to do so,
where it can gain no monetary benefit from the leasc in view
of thc fact that, other than the goodwill that it may engender
for itself, the sole benefit it will derive is the ability to promote
a public trust purpose that happens also to be its own, and
'where the public benefit that will result from its operation
of the facility at its own expense is elearly sufficient consider-

[3J See Ca1.Jur.2d, State of California, § 105; Am.Jur., Public
Funds, § 61.
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ation for it.s use of the buildin{; And such ineidp.ntnl Donmonctnry bcnp.fits as it may rcc('ivc.
[5] Id.-Property-Tidelands-Le&ses.-A proposed lease of a
building by the city of Long Beach, to be constructed by the
city on tidelands granted the city by the state for trust purposes, is not objectionable as violating the civil service provisions of the city charter on the ground that those provisions
require the city to (,XE'Cui(' the trust purposes itself by means
of civil service personnel, since administration of the tidelands
trust for the benefit of all the people of the state is not a
municipal affair, the statutes creating the trust and regulating
its administration expressly authorize leases to promote its
purposes, and accordingly any conflicting limitations in the
city charter are inapplicable.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. A. Curtis Smith, Judge. Affirmed.
Proceeding by city to secure a declaration of its right to
use trust funds to construct a building on tidelands to be
leased to the Y.M.C.A. Judgment approving proposed expenditures and lease, affirmed.
Stanley Mosk and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General,
Leonard M. Friedman, Assistant Attorney General, and F. G.
Girard, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellants.
Theodore R. Gabrielson as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
Walhfred Jacobson, City Attorney, O'Melveny & Myers
and Pierce Works for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1911, the State of California granted
to the city of Long Beach the tidelands and submerged lands
lying within the city's boundaries in trust for certain uses and
purposes connected with the development of Long Beach Harbor. (Stats. 1911, ch. 676, p. 1304.) The original grant
stated "That said lands shall be used by said city and by its
successors, solely for the establishment, improvement and
conduct of a harbor, and for the construction, maintenance and
operation thereon of wharves, docks, piers, slips, quays, and
other utilities, structures and appliances necessary or convenient for the promotion and accommodation of commerce and
navigation, and said city, or its successors, shall not, at any
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time, grant, convey, givc or alien said lands, or any part
thereof, to any individual, firm or ('orporation for any purpose
whatsoever; p,·ovidcd, that said city, or its successors, may
grant franchises thereon, for limited periods, for wharves
and other public uses and purposes, and may lease said lands,
or any part thereof, for limited periods, for purposes consistent with the trusts upon which said lands are held by the
Stat.e of California and with the requirements of commerce or
navigation at said harbor.... " (Stats. 1911, ch. 676, p. 1305.) .
The terms of the original trust were amended by the Legislature in 1925 (Stats. 1925, ch. 102, pp. 235-236) and 1935.
(Stats. 1935, ch. 158, pp. 793-795.)
!
Following the discovery of oil under the tidelands in 1937,·
it was determined in Oily of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Cal.
2d 609 [82 P.2d 362], that the city had the right to produce
oil and gas from these land!>, and in Oity of Long Beach v.
MQrse, 31 Cal.2d 254 [188 P.2d 17], that the oil and gas
revenue could be used only for trust purposes. In 1951, the
Legislature found that approximately 50 per cent of the oil
and gas revenue was no longer needed for trust purposes and
declared such part of the revenue free from the public trust
for navigation, commerce, and fisheries. (Stats. 1951, ch. 915,
pp. 2444-2445.) In Mallon v. Oity of Long Beack, 44 Cal.2d
199 [282 P.2d 481], it was determined that the state, not the
city, was entitled to the revenue freed from the trust by its
partial revocation.
Thereafter the state brought an action against the city to
recover the funds to which it was entitled under the decision
in the Mallon case. In 1956 the Legislature took note of this
litigation and concluded that the public interest would best
be served by its prompt settlement. Accordingly, it authorized
a settlement dividing the oil and gas revenue between the state
and the city, and provided that the latter's share should con-;
tinue to be held in trust and expended for trust purposes. It
set forth a nonexclusive list of trust purposes that were
declared to be matters of state, as distinguished from local,·
interest and benefit, and it expressed its belief "that the Attorney General and said city should seek judicial determinations
further defining said city's rights and duties~in the premises."
(Stats. 1st Ex. Sess. 1956, ch. 29.) Pursuant to this legislation a consent decree was entered settling the main points of
dispute between the state and the city, but the trial court
reserved jurisdiction to determine whether given proposed
expenditures were or were not within the power of the city to
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make as trustee in possession of its share of the oil and gas
revenue.
Thereafter the city commenced the present proceedings to
secure a declaration of its right to use trust funds to construct
a building to be leased to the National Board of the Young
Men's Christian Association. The trial court entered judgment approving the proposed expenditures and lease. The
state appeals ..
Since 1936 the Y.M.C.A. has been operating a facility known
as the Armed Services Y.M.C.A. on tidelands leased from the
city at a rental of $1.00 per year. This facility was erected
without cost to the city, and the lease was executed pursuant
to the 1935 amendment to the trust terms, which provided
•• That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to
prevent •.. the leasing or use of such tidelands or submerged
lands for limited periods for the construction, maintenance,
and operation of nonprofit benevolent and charitable institutions organized and conducted for the promotion of the
moral and social welfare of seamen, naval officers and enlisted
men, and other persons engaged in and about the harbor and
commerce, fishery, and navigation." (Stats. 1935, ch. 158, p.
794.) Owing to freeway construction, the relocation of the
Navy Landing, and soil subsidence, the Armed Services
Y.M.C.A. requires a new building at a new location if it is to
continue adequately to serve its purposes. The city proposes
to construct this building on a tideland site with tideland
revenue at a cost of over $900,000 and lease it for 25 years to
the Y.M.C.A. for the continued operation of the Armed
Services Y.M.C.A.
The proposed lease provides that the "Lessee shall use the
demised premises, together with the building and facilities
located thereon, solely and exclusively for the purposes of, and
it shall devote its special knowledge and experience to, managing, operating, conducting and maintaining therein and thereon, without compensation for its services in so doing, a rest,
recreation and entertainment center for the use and accommodation of, and for the benefit and for the promotion of the
moral and social welfare of, members of the Armed Forces of
the United States, merchant seamen and other persons engaged
in and about the harbor and in commerce and navigation.•.. "
. It shall provide suitable dormitory and sanitary accommodations; adequate meal service; suitable entertainment; and
"such additional services and facilities, including a social
room, lounge, game room, lockers, showers, telephone booths,
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the meaning of section 22, for if it were, the state would be
powerless to contract with any organization not expressly
exempted from the constitutional limitations.
[4] In the present case, the statc contends that the carrying out of the city's plan must be regarded as a gift of the
use of a valuable building for 25 years to the Y.M.C.A. to
enable it to perform its private charitable purposes and that
such a gift cannot be justified solely because a public purpose
will also be served. The city contends that the benefits
derived by the Y.M.C.A. are merely incidental to the public
purpose and that the Y.M.C.A.'s performance of its obligations under the lease will constitute full and adequate consideration for its use of the bUilding.
County of Los Angeles v. Southern Calif. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.
2d 378 [196 P.2d 773], compels the resolution of these conllicting contentions in favor of the city. In that case the
court sustained the grant of a franchise to a public utility
pursuant to Civil Code, section 536, and drew a distinction
between such a grant and an absolute grant in fee or an
appropriation of public money. "A franchise such as is authorized by section 536 is not an absolute grant in fee or an appropriation of money, but is merely a limited right to use the
highways and only to the extent necessary for the furnishing
of services to the public. Also, the privilege must be exercised 'in such manner and at such points as not to incommode
the public use of the road or highway.' (Civ. Code, § 536.) It
is obvious that the right acquired by the company is of less
substance than the transfers involved in the cited cases which
condemn appropriations of money and grants in fee.
"Moreover, the state is assured of a continuing benefit in
return for the privilege granted under section 536, whereas
this may not be true in transactions involving an outright
appropriation or transfer in fee. The company must not only
construct a telephone system but it must render service, and
if it fails to do so the franchise terminates. Thus the state
receives benefits during the life of the franchise, since in order
to retain it the company must continue to serve the public.
If and when the public benefit ceases and the franchisf expires,
the state is in as good a position as it was before the limited
privilege was granted. The building of a public utility and
consequent benefit to the people may not be a sufficient consideration to support a grant in fee, but it does not follow that
the benefit received from the construction and continued operation of a telephone system is not an adequate consideration for
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the us!' of the highways so long as the public service continuel;." (32 Ca1.2d at 387-388.)
In the present case there is also no grant in fee or
appropriation of money to a private organization. The
Y.M.C.A. receives only the use of the building for 25 years
on condition tlmt at all times it carries out the trust purposes
for the public benefit under the supervision of the city. When
it ceases to do so its rights in the building terminate. More·
over, it can gain no monetary benefit from the lease. Thus,
other than the goodwill that it may engender for itself, the sole
benefit it will derive is the ability to promote a public trust
purpose that happens also to be one of its own. Under these
circumstances, the public benefit that will result from the
Y.M.C.A.'s operation of the facility at its own expense is
clearly sufficient consideration for the Y.M.C.A.'s use of the
building and such incidental nonmonetary benefits as it may
receive.
[5] Finally the state contends that the lease will violate
the civil service provisions of the Long Beach city charter 011
the ground that those provisions require the city to execute
the trust purposes itself by means of civil service personnel.
There is no merit in this contention. The administration of the
tidelands trust for the benefit of all of the people of the state
is not a municipal affair, and the statutes creating the trust
and regulating its administration expressly authorize. leases
to promote its purposes. Accordingly, any conflicting limitations in the cit.y charter are inapplicable. (Oivic Center
Assn. v. Railroad Com., 175 Cal. 441, 445 [166 P. 351];
Pasade'TI.a v. OharZevt1Ze, 215 Cal. 384, 388 [10 P.2d 745].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb,
J., and Peters, J., concurred.
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